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Groundwater is a critical resource for Califor-nia’s agricultural sector, accounting for almost 40% of agricultural water use, and far more in 
drought years (DWR 2015). Many groundwater basins, 
particularly in the Central Valley, have experienced 
significant declines in groundwater levels over the past 
several decades, and the recent drought heightened 
concerns over these declines and associated impacts. In 
2014, the California Legislature passed the Sustainable 
Groundwater Management Act (SGMA), introducing 
for the first time a requirement that local agencies man-
age groundwater sustainably or face state intervention. 
SGMA grants broad authority for groundwater 
management to locally formed groundwater sustain-
ability agencies (GSAs). Local agencies were given until 
June 30, 2017, to establish GSAs and until 2020 or 2022 
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Abstract
The Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) is introducing 
significant changes in the way groundwater is governed for agricultural 
use. It requires the formation of groundwater sustainability agencies 
(GSAs) to manage groundwater basins for sustainability with the 
engagement of all users. That presents opportunities for collaboration, 
as well as challenges, particularly in basins with large numbers of 
agricultural water users who have longstanding private pumping rights. 
The GSA formation process has resulted in the creation of multiple GSAs 
in many such basins, particularly in the Central Valley. In case studies 
of three basins, we examine agricultural stakeholders’ concerns about 
SGMA, and how these are being addressed in collaborative approaches 
to groundwater basin governance. We find that many water districts and 
private pumpers share a strong interest in maintaining local autonomy, 
but they have distinct concerns and different options for forming and 
participating in GSAs. Multilevel collaborative governance structures may 
help meet SGMA’s requirements for broad stakeholder engagement, our 
studies suggest, while also addressing concerns about autonomy and 
including agricultural water users in decision-making.
The Sustainable Groundwater Management Act 
mandates the formation of groundwater sustainability 
agencies (GSAs) to manage groundwater basins, 
and requires broad stakeholder participation in 
these agencies. This research finds that multilevel 
collaborative governance structures — those that 
include nongovernmental entities such as nonprofits, 
landowners and farmers — can help ensure that 
agricultural users' interests are represented adequately 
in GSA decision-making. 
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(depending on basin conditions) to adopt groundwater 
sustainability plans (GSPs), which must consider all 
“beneficial uses and users” (California Water Code 
[CWC] § 10723.2, California State Legislature, 2014). In 
groundwater basins where agriculture plays an impor-
tant role, the number of beneficial users can be large, 
in some cases including thousands of landowners who 
have long exercised their overlying pumping rights. 
Collaborative governance
In recent decades, collaborative governance has gained 
attention as an effective approach to managing com-
mon pool resources, including groundwater (Megdal et 
al. 2017; Ostrom 1990). Collaborative governance has 
been defined as “the processes and structures of public 
policy decision-making and management that engage 
people constructively across the boundaries of pub-
lic agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, 
private and civic spheres in order to carry out a public 
purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished” 
(Emerson et al. 2012, 2). 
Collaborative governance typically involves engag-
ing nongovernmental entities in public policy decision-
making, which is expected to help develop shared 
knowledge, trust and buy-in among diverse interests 
(Ansell and Gash 2008; Innes and Booher 2010). In the 
context of groundwater governance, such nongovern-
mental entities would include individual landowners 
and farmers as well as private or nonprofit organiza-
tions representing agricultural interests, among others. 
While public agencies hold authority deriving from 
legislative mandates, the influence of nongovernmental 
entities in a collaborative process is grounded in their 
authentic representation of key interests and widely 
accepted values, referred to as discursive legitimacy 
(Purdy 2012).
Organizing successful collaborations at large scales 
can be challenging, requiring special efforts to design 
and track meaningful participation and representation 
(Ansell and Torfing 2015; DuPraw 2014). Multilevel 
governance structures featuring collaboration among 
entities at different scales may be one way to achieve 
meaningful engagement (Newig and Fritsch 2009). For 
example, in a river basin, instead of forming a single, 
basinwide governing body, local agencies and stake-
holders work together at smaller scales, but coordinate 
their efforts across the basin. However, we still have 
much to learn about how multilevel structures work in 
practice (Huitema et al. 2009).
In California, collaborative governance in water 
management has been encouraged in recent decades 
(Hughes and Pincetl 2014). It has played an important 
role in the success of certain groundwater adjudica-
tions and special act districts in reducing overdraft, 
but most of these examples are in urban areas or rela-
tively small basins (Blomquist 1992). Across much of 
the state — including the Central Valley, where basins 
are large, overdraft is severe, agricultural use is high 
and overlying rights holders are numerous — collab-
orative plans to manage groundwater prior to SGMA 
were voluntary, lacking binding commitments to ad-
dress groundwater depletion and its impacts (Nelson 
2011). By contrast, SGMA requires that in over 125 
designated medium- or high-priority basins local 
management must achieve groundwater sustainability 
within 20 years of GSP adoption or be subject to state 
intervention. GSPs must avoid “significant and un-
reasonable” reductions in groundwater levels and five 
other “undesirable results.” 
SGMA effectively requires collaborative governance 
at the basin scale in the context of developing and 
implementing GSPs, as distinct from the discretion it 
allows in GSA formation. If there are multiple GSAs 
within a groundwater basin, they must either work 
together to develop a single GSP or sign a coordination 
agreement ensuring that their multiple GSPs are based 
on common data and assumptions (CWC § 10727.6) 
(alternatively, local agencies could collaborate to form 
a single GSA covering the entire basin, and develop a 
single GSP). In addition, per statutory language, GSAs 
must encourage the “active involvement” of all “benefi-
cial users” of groundwater in the development of a GSP 
(CWC § 10727.8).
In forming GSAs, on the other hand, SGMA 
required public involvement but not necessarily col-
laborative governance. All beneficial users of ground-
water had to be consulted in GSA formation (CWC 
§ 10723.2), but they were not required to be included 
in decision-making structures. Public agencies had 
the authority to form GSAs individually and at any 
scale. Private pumpers and nonprofit entities such as 
the Farm Bureau, however, could not. Local agencies 
could take a collaborative approach to the GSA forma-
tion process by including representatives of beneficial 
users in GSA and basinwide governance structures. 
Alternatively, agencies could provide beneficial users 
with opportunities for public input but not a role in 
Landowners and other 
stakeholders participate in 
a public meeting about the 
formation of a GSA in Yolo 
County. The resulting GSA 
covers the vast majority 
of the Yolo basin; it has 
a multilevel governance 
structure that includes the 
Yolo County Farm Bureau 
as a voting member. 
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decision-making within 
the GSA or in coordina-
tion at the basin scale.
Case studies in 
three basins
Agriculture has long 
been a critical driver 
of water management 
in California, and 
SGMA has significant 
implications for how 
agricultural water is 
managed. To examine 
how collaborative gov-
ernance structures are 
emerging at the basin 
scale, we undertook 
case studies of three 
groundwater basins in 
California’s Central 
Valley that have fol-
lowed a collaborative 
governance approach, 
and we reviewed data 
about GSA formation 
statewide. We address two questions in our case 
studies: What are agricultural stakeholders’ primary 
concerns in designing groundwater governance 
under SGMA, and how were those concerns repre-
sented in GSA formation. Our aims are to deepen 
our understanding of how collaborative processes 
can be structured to manage resources at large 
scales and to lay the groundwork for future research 
regarding the effectiveness of those governance ar-
rangements in accommodating diverse stakeholder 
interests.
Our case studies include the Colusa and Yolo sub-
basins of the Sacramento Valley groundwater basin and 
the Eastern San Joaquin subbasin of the San Joaquin 
Valley basin (fig. 1). Under SGMA, subbasins are 
treated as groundwater basins, so for simplicity we use 
the term “basin” for both. These basins were selected 
because they are relatively large, agriculture plays a 
significant role in each one, and stakeholders in each of 
these areas took a collaborative approach to GSA for-
mation at the basin scale. 
In all three basins, farmers generally use surface 
water for irrigation but switch to groundwater when 
surface supplies are curtailed. Tree crops are impor-
tant in all three basins, with a particularly significant 
expansion in Yolo County, where almond acreage has 
more than doubled since 2010. This expansion is plac-
ing additional demand on groundwater, since much 
of this land was previously unirrigated (Morain 2015). 
Agricultural production and groundwater dependence 
are greatest in the Eastern San Joaquin basin, which 
is critically overdrafted and must complete its GSP by 
2020 instead of 2022. Farms are on average smaller in 
this basin, and more farmland is under irrigation. Table 
1 summarizes key features of the three basins.
In all three cases, discussions about a collaborative 
approach to GSA formation at the basin scale began 
early and lasted for more than a year. A convening en-
tity played a key role, seeking to include stakeholders 
across the basin in a group decision-making process (in 
the Colusa basin, Glenn and Colusa counties conducted 
TABLE 1. Overview of case studies in three basins
Yolo Colusa Eastern San Joaquin
Land area (sq miles) 788 1,099 1,202
Population (2010)* 194,158 48,369 582,662
No. of counties† 2 2 3
Agricultural production value (2015)‡ $510 million $752 million $2.26 billion
Top three crops (by value, 2015)§ Tomatoes, almonds, grapes Almonds, rice, walnuts Almonds, grapes, walnuts
Average farm size (acres, 2012)§ 456 545 220
Percentage of farmland under irrigation§ 50% 47% 62%
Groundwater basin priority (2014)* High Medium High, critically overdrafted
Percentage of water use accounted for by groundwater* 25% 10% 43%
No. of GSAs¶ 2  2 17
No. of GSA-eligible entities 33 47 24
Length of GSA formation process (months) 19 16 (Colusa County); 13 (Glenn 
County)
20
Sources: 2016 basin boundaries shapefile (DWR 2015; California Statewide Groundwater Elevation Monitoring Program prioritization data (DWR 2014), California Agricultural Statistics Review 2015–2016 (CDFA 2016), 
2012 Census of Agriculture (USDA 2014), and GSA formation meeting notes.
* Estimates based on 2003 groundwater basin boundaries. 
† A very small area of the Yolo subbasin falls within neighboring Solano County. 
‡ Estimates based on county-level data and percentage of county area within each basin. 
§ Estimates based on county data (Yolo and San Joaquin counties for Yolo and Eastern San Joaquin basins, and average of Glenn and Colusa counties for Colusa basin). 
¶ 900 acres of the Yolo basin fall within a reclamation district that formed a separate GSA. This GSA plans to join in a single GSP for the Yolo subbasin.
Eastern San Joaquin
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Colusa
San Francisco
Sacramento
Redding
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FIG. 1. Case study 
groundwater basins.
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separate processes but communicated regularly). In 
the Colusa and Eastern San Joaquin basins, county 
governments convened these meetings; in the Yolo ba-
sin, a nonprofit water association and the Yolo County 
Farm Bureau led the process. Professional facilitation 
services were used in all three basins, supported by 
funding from the California Department of Water 
Resources (DWR). 
Although not representative of all groundwater ba-
sins in California, these cases offer insight into the in-
terests of agricultural communities under SGMA, and 
how these interests have influenced GSA governance 
structures. Data was gathered from governance docu-
ments and meeting notes, as well as from observations 
of GSA formation meetings during 2016 and 2017, as 
described in the online technical appendix. In addition, 
two co-authors served as facilitators for GSA formation 
in the Yolo and Colusa basins and contributed their 
knowledge of stakeholder concerns and decisions there.
GSA formation study
SGMA allows local public agencies with water sup-
ply, water management or land use responsibilities to 
form GSAs. They may do so as single agencies, or join 
with other local agencies to form a multi-agency GSA 
through a joint powers agreement (JPA) or memo-
randum of agreement (MOA). Each proposed GSA 
was required to send a notice to DWR, indicating its 
boundaries, the local agencies involved and a descrip-
tion of how it would engage 10 types of beneficial users 
of groundwater (CWC § 10723.2, and listed in the tech-
nical appendix). 
We reviewed GSA formation notices submitted to 
DWR via its online SGMA portal as of June 30, 2017 
(agencies could still revise or submit new notices af-
ter that date). We compiled data regarding GSA type 
(single or multi-agency), beneficial users identified and 
agricultural interests in GSA governance. We also re-
corded the number of GSAs declared in each high- and 
medium-priority basin and evaluated basin coverage 
by GSAs. The technical appendix provides additional 
detail on methods.
Agriculture represented in 
most GSAs 
A diverse array of interests is present within most GSAs 
in California. Our analysis of GSA formation notices 
indicates that at least five of the 10 SGMA-identified 
beneficial users are present in over 80% of all GSAs. 
Agricultural interests are present in nearly all GSAs; 
87% of GSAs reported the presence of overlying rights 
for agricultural use.
Beneficial users have been represented in the GSA 
formation process through a mix of public and pri-
vate entities. Table 2 shows the types of entities that 
participated in GSA formation meetings in our three 
case studies. Most have direct or indirect interests in 
agriculture. Local irrigation, reclamation and water 
districts, and some mutual water companies represent 
landowners who have access to surface water but often 
rely in part upon groundwater. Private pumpers are 
landowners who are not part of a district, and usually 
rely solely upon groundwater for irrigation, domestic 
use, or both. Municipalities deliver water for domestic 
use, but many residents of these cities have ties to ag-
riculture. Agricultural interests were also represented 
through nonprofit associations, particularly by the 
Farm Bureau in each county.
Agricultural interests, concerns 
GSA formation represents a significant change for 
many agricultural users, who in most of California 
have historically faced few constraints in exercising 
their overlying rights to pump groundwater. Although 
SGMA explicitly states that it does not alter property 
rights, it grants substantial authority to GSAs, includ-
ing to establish fees, limit extractions and require 
metering in some instances. In our case studies, lo-
cal agencies and private pumpers who participated 
in GSA formation expressed a strong preference to 
establish GSAs rather than to allow the state to inter-
vene. However, many were concerned about the pros-
pect of larger-scale public agencies such as counties 
TABLE 2. Local entities with groundwater interests involved in GSA formation in the 
three basins
Yolo Colusa
Eastern San 
Joaquin
Local agencies (GSA-eligible)
Water districts ✔ ✔ ✔
Irrigation districts ✔ ✔ ✔
Reclamation districts ✔ ✔ ✔
Cities ✔ ✔ ✔
Counties ✔ ✔ ✔
Community service districts ✔ ✔ ✔
Drainage districts ✔ ✔
Levee districts ✔
Resource conservation districts ✔ ✔
Water management–related JPAs ✔ ✔
Private water companies ✔ ✔ ✔
Landowners/private pumpers ✔ ✔
County farm bureau ✔ ✔ ✔
Nonprofit water user associations ✔
Environmental or other nongovernmental 
agencies
✔ ✔
Tribes ✔
Sources: participant lists in GSA formation meeting notes (Colusa and eastern San Joaquin basins) and meeting observations 
(Yolo basin).
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establishing GSAs, because of the potentially limited 
familiarity with local water conditions and agricultural 
needs.
Local water districts and private pumpers had 
distinct interests and options with respect to their par-
ticipation in GSA formation. In our case studies — as 
is true across much of the state — most local irrigation, 
water and reclamation districts have access to surface 
water, which provides an alternative water source to 
groundwater and can be used for direct or in-lieu 
groundwater recharge. During the GSA formation pro-
cesses that we observed, many of these districts were 
concerned about retaining control of surface water de-
liveries and receiving credit for groundwater recharge 
in the basinwide water budget that must be included in 
GSPs. Some sought to protect their interests by forming 
their own GSAs, as local agencies with water manage-
ment responsibilities have the right to do under SGMA. 
In the Colusa basin, as many as 15 GSA notices were 
submitted to DWR. Once Glenn and Colusa counties 
began to convene discussions toward collaboratively 
forming multi-agency GSAs, districts agreed to par-
ticipate but developed a set of “districts’ principles” to 
convey their common interests. A few mutual water 
companies shared interests similar to those of the local 
districts and participated in developing these principles 
(under SGMA, water companies cannot form their 
own GSAs but can be invited by public agencies to be a 
member of a multi-agency GSA.) 
In contrast to the districts’ situation, most private 
pumpers in our case study basins are entirely reliant 
upon groundwater for irrigation and domestic pur-
poses and have invested significant personal funds in 
their well systems. In addition, their areas have often 
experienced the most significant declines in ground-
water levels and require more substantial management 
actions under SGMA. 
In these areas — often called “white areas” because 
they are not covered by other local districts — SGMA 
presumes that the county will serve as the GSA. In our 
case studies, many private pumpers did not believe that 
their county would adequately represent their interests; 
they were particularly concerned about the potential 
fees and pumping restrictions that could be imposed. 
They sought to establish avenues to represent their 
interests in the GSA formation process, and ultimately 
in GSA governance. Their ability to do this rested upon 
the widely recognized legitimacy of their interests, 
leading the convening entities to take steps toward 
meaningfully including the voices of private pumpers.
In Yolo and Eastern San Joaquin basins, private 
pumpers looked to their county Farm Bureaus to rep-
resent their interests in the GSA formation process. 
In the Yolo basin, the Water Resources Association 
(WRA, which is composed of irrigation districts, cities 
and the county) has for several decades been a trusted 
forum for discussion of the county’s water management 
issues, even more so than the county itself. Aware of 
the Farm Bureau’s strong relationships with individual 
landowners, the WRA invited the Farm Bureau to co-
convene the GSA formation process.  Their high level 
of credibility among agricultural stakeholders resulted 
in those stakeholders being included in the process of 
GSA formation. In particular, the Farm Bureau con-
ducted outreach that resulted in the participation of 
hundreds of private pumpers in public forums about 
GSA formation. 
In the Colusa basin, private pumper advisory 
committees were created by each of the two counties 
(Colusa and Glenn). They were composed of private 
pumper representatives who attended GSA formation 
meetings and provided concrete proposals for how the 
GSA could be structured to ensure their interests were 
represented.   
Multiple GSAs per basin
Numerous water districts in our case studies initially 
decided to form their own GSAs to retain control 
over surface and groundwater management activi-
ties within their jurisdictions. In the Yolo and Colusa 
basins, as GSA discussions progressed, many decided 
to withdraw their notices and join with others to form 
multi-agency GSAs. However, in the Eastern San Joa-
quin basin, only a few multi-agency GSAs have formed. 
Most local agencies have remained single-agency GSAs, 
resulting in 17 separate GSAs within the basin.
Single agency GSAs are also most common state-
wide. Agencies may still revise their GSA arrangements 
but as of the SGMA June 30, 2017, deadline 253 agen-
cies had formed GSAs. The vast majority (70%) are 
single agencies. Half are involved in managing water 
for agriculture (e.g., irrigation or reclamation districts). 
Agricultural interests also appear to be well repre-
sented in the governance structures of multi-agency 
GSAs (see table 3).
As of June 30, 2017, one or more GSAs had been de-
clared in 113 of the high- and medium-priority basins 
(GSA formation was not required in some basins that 
were covered by adjudications or alternative plans). 
Of these basins, 50 (44%) have a single GSA covering 
the entire basin; 29 of those 50 GSAs are multi-agency 
TABLE 3. Types of GSAs declared as of June 30, 3017
GSA type  
No. of GSAs 
declared
Percentage of 
total GSAs
Single-agency GSAs 177 70%
Agencies managing water for agriculture 89 35%
Other agencies 88 35%
Multi-agency GSAs (JPAs and MOAs) 76 30%
Member(s) of board or advisory committee represent 
agricultural interests
61 24%
No specific agricultural representation 15 6%
Total GSAs declared 253  100%
Source: GSA formation notices posted in DWR’s SGMA portal (DWR 2017). See technical appendix.
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GSAs. The remaining 63 basins are covered by between 
two and 22 GSAs, or coverage is shared between at 
least one GSA and an adjudicated area. As figure 2 il-
lustrates, nearly all of the basins in the Central Valley 
are covered by multiple GSAs. A number of these 
basins have been designated by the state as “critically 
overdrafted,” which 
under SGMA must 
complete a GSP by 
2020 rather than 
2022 in order to avoid 
state intervention 
(CWC § 10720.7).
Multilevel 
collaborative 
governance 
On the face of it, 
the large number of 
single-agency GSAs 
and basins with mul-
tiple GSAs suggests 
that collaboration 
under SGMA 
may be 
limited, particularly in the large agricultural basins of 
the Central Valley. However, our cases indicated that 
there had been significant collaboration in at least some 
of the basins with multiple GSAs. 
In the Yolo and Colusa basins, collaborative, 
multi-agency GSAs were created, reducing the num-
ber of GSAs to two per basin. (The Yolo Subbasin 
Groundwater Agency covers the entire basin except 
200 acres that fall within a reclamation district, which 
plans to work with the agency on a single GSP.) In the 
Eastern San Joaquin basin, the 17 GSAs have developed 
a relatively strong collaborative governance structure 
at the basin scale.  In all three basins, multilevel gov-
ernance arrangements have emerged that allow local 
agencies to retain some autonomy, and for private 
pumpers and other interests to have a voice in decision-
making. In addition to being reflected in academic 
literature (Newig and Fritsch 2009), this multilevel 
approach has been articulated in practical terms as the 
“local implementing agency” (LIA) model for GSA for-
mation (Ceppos 2016).
 Figure 3 illustrates the multilevel governance ar-
rangements that have emerged in our three cases. 
While the structure and number of GSAs differ, in each 
basin decision-making and participation are distrib-
uted across three levels — basinwide, multi-agency and 
individual agency — and a distinct set of activities 
is associated with each.
Basinwide level: GSP development
In all three cases, basin-scale decision-making 
focuses on coordination of GSP development, in-
cluding securing grant funds, hiring consul-
tants, data management and monitoring. 
These basinwide structures emerged in 
large part to share costs and to en-
sure compliance with SGMA’s 
coordination requirements. 
In Yolo, the decision-
making body at the 
basin scale is the 
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FIG. 2. Number of GSAs formed in high- and medium-priority basins 
as of June 30, 2017. Basins categorized as low- or very low–priority 
basins, where GSA formation is not required, are not shown on this 
map. GSA formation is also not required in high- and medium-priority 
basins that are covered by adjudications or alternative plans (hatched 
areas). See technical appendix for further details.
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GSA; in Eastern San Joaquin, it is a JPA composed of 
all 17 GSAs. In the Colusa basin, basinwide governance 
structures are still evolving, but, so far, subcommittees 
of the boards of the two county-level GSAs are work-
ing together on aspects of planning and grant proposal 
development. 
The restriction of deci-
sion-making powers at the 
basin level was a frequent 
topic of discussion in GSA 
formation meetings. As 
articulated by an irrigation 
district board member in 
Yolo County, “I don’t want 
a city telling us when to 
turn our water on.” During 
several GSA formation 
meetings, those involved 
in convening the process repeatedly acknowledged this 
concern and emphasized the need to structure the GSA 
so that as much authority as possible was delegated to 
local agencies. The JPA establishing the Yolo Subbasin 
Groundwater Agency reflected this, stating that “the 
Agency will serve a coordinating and administrative 
role” without limiting a member’s “rights or authority 
over its own water supply matters,” although the GSA 
retains the right to intervene if sustainability criteria 
are not being met (Section 8.1, p. 13). 
In the Eastern San Joaquin basin, significant por-
tions of several meetings were focused on ensuring that 
the basinwide JPA, which holds the common powers 
of its member GSAs, would not usurp the authority 
of local agencies. The final JPA text restricted the 
basinwide JPA from undertaking activities “includ-
ing, without limitation, the restriction or regulation of 
groundwater extractions,” within the service areas of 
members without their consent (Section 3.6, p. 5).
In the basin-scale governance structures in the Yolo 
and Eastern San Joaquin basins, private pumper inter-
ests are represented by the Farm Bureau. In the Yolo 
basin, the Farm Bureau serves as one of five affiliated 
parties who hold voting seats on the GSA board. (Other 
affiliates include an environmental representative, 
two mutual water companies and a university.) In the 
Eastern San Joaquin basin, the Farm Bureau does not 
have a voting seat but will serve in an advisory capacity 
to the basinwide JPA, since membership is restricted to 
GSAs. This arrangement builds upon the Farm Bureau’s 
long history of working with most of the local agen-
cies involved and its experience serving in a nonvoting 
advisory role to a previous JPA responsible for ground-
water management. 
Multi-agency level: management actions 
Planning for the management actions needed to reach 
a basin’s sustainability goals is largely being conducted 
by multiple agencies at a scale smaller than a basin (re-
ferred to here as the “multi-agency level”). In the Yolo 
basin, five management areas have been defined within 
the Yolo Subbasin Groundwater Agency, roughly fol-
lowing groundwater conditions and usage patterns: Ca-
pay Valley, North Yolo, Central Yolo, Yolo Zamora, and 
South Yolo. The specifics of how members and affiliated 
parties will work together within each management 
Yolo Subbasin  
Groundwater Agency (GSA)
19-member JPA, including one 
tribe; Farm Bureau and four 
others are voting affiliates
Yolo
Basinwide level
Coordination activities for GSP 
development
Multi-agency level
Planning for management 
actions 
Individual agency level
Responsibility for GSP 
implementation and setting fees
Colusa Eastern San Joaquin
Eastern San Joaquin 
Groundwater Authority
17-member JPA (must be GSAs);  
Farm Bureau in advisory capacity
Five management areas 
2–9 agencies each, with advisory 
committees and public input 
(anticipated)
Members and affiliated 
parties
Coordination between  
two committees
established by the boards of 
the two county-level GSAs
Colusa 
Groundwater 
Authority 
(GSA)
12-member 
JPA, 2 private 
pumper voting 
seats
Glenn 
Groundwater 
Authority 
(GSA)
9-member JPA, 
private pumpers 
advise county
Multi-agency 
GSAs
Three MOAs 
(2–4 member 
agencies each)
Management 
areas (planned)
Management 
areas (planned)
Member 
agencies
Single 
agency GSAs
Member 
agencies
Member 
agencies
FIG. 3. In each case study, decision-making was distributed across at least three levels. At the basin level, the focus is on coordination and GSP 
development, while planning for most management actions will occur at the multi-agency level. In keeping with concerns about autonomy, decisions 
about plan implementation and fees will be undertaken by individual agencies.
In all three basins, multilevel 
governance arrangements have 
emerged that allow local agencies 
to retain some autonomy, and for 
private pumpers and other interests 
to have a voice in decision-making.
50 CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE • VOLUME 72, NUMBER 1
area have not yet been spelled out, but advisory com-
mittees and opportunities for public involvement are 
anticipated.
In the Colusa basin, planning for management 
actions will be undertaken by the two multi-agency 
GSAs, which have formed along county lines with 
each covering approximately half of the basin. The two 
county-level GSAs also anticipate forming management 
areas, adding yet another governance level. 
Although much of the Eastern San Joaquin basin 
is covered by single-agency GSAs, three  multi-agency 
GSAs have formed in certain subareas of the basin. 
For example, the portion of the basin that falls outside 
of San Joaquin County is being managed by a multi-
agency GSA composed of two county governments and 
two water districts.
Private pumpers are involved at the multi-agency 
level in several ways. In the Colusa County portion 
of the Colusa basin, there are two voting seats for pri-
vate pumpers on the board of this multi-agency GSA, 
both of whom are representatives from the county’s 
Groundwater Commission. In the Glenn County por-
tion of this basin, private pumpers do not sit directly on 
the GSA board but instead advise the county — which 
is a member of the GSA — through the previously 
established Private Pumpers Advisory Committee. 
Private pumpers will also likely play a role in the Yolo 
basin by participating in advisory committees to be 
established for each management area.
Individual agency level: GSP implementation
Individual agencies represent a third level of decision-
making and action, focused on GSP implementation in 
our case study basins. The delegation of this authority 
— particularly as related to groundwater use restric-
tions and fees — to local agencies was critical to reach-
ing agreement to create larger-scale GSAs. For example, 
one of the Colusa basin’s districts’ principles, which 
set out criteria for the districts joining a multi-agency 
GSA, required that the GSA’s governance structure be 
guided by “respect for each member’s discretion, gov-
ernmental authority, and expertise and knowledge of 
its groundwater conditions, demands and concerns,” as 
well as an “avoidance of ‘top down’ planning and im-
plementation” (Districts’ principles presentation, Oct. 
11, 2016). The JPAs establishing the GSAs in Yolo and 
Colusa basins, as well as the basinwide JPA of GSAs in 
Eastern San Joaquin, contain clauses specifying that 
fee setting and GSP implementation will primarily be 
undertaken by member agencies.
As of June 30, 2017, the counties in each basin were 
formally serving as the local agencies representing the 
interests of private pumpers. However, as described 
earlier, in all three basins private pumpers have avenues 
to voice their concerns at the multi-agency or basin lev-
els. In the Yolo basin, private pumpers have expressed 
a preference to be represented by a water district rather 
than the county, and efforts are under way by this water 
district to annex private pumper areas.
The expansion of tree 
crops in Yolo County, 
where almond acreage 
has more than doubled 
since 2010, has led to 
increased demand for 
groundwater. The extent 
and distribution of tree 
crops may affect farmers' 
interests in participating 
in a GSA and might 
shape how management 
areas are formed. 
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Fair and effective?
SGMA presents significant challenges and opportuni-
ties for collaborative governance, particularly in large 
agricultural basins where beneficial users are numerous 
and diverse. The GSA formation process has resulted 
in the creation of multiple GSAs in many such basins, 
particularly in the Central Valley. As summarized in 
the sidebar "Key Case Study Findings", our case stud-
ies show how multi-level governance structures have 
helped in such settings to meet SGMA’s requirements 
for collaborative management at the basin scale while 
also enabling broad participation and addressing local 
agency concerns about autonomy. They also illustrate 
how private pumpers have sought and gained a voice in 
GSA governance arrangements based upon the widely 
recognized legitimacy of their interests.
Kiparsky et al. (2016) call for ensuring that GSA 
governance structures are both fair and effective, and 
identify criteria for evaluating governance options 
along these two dimensions. Although they have only 
just started to function, the governance arrangements 
in our case studies have the potential to meet some of 
those criteria. For example, the inclusion of private 
pumpers into decision-making structures enhances 
representation and participation, two of the criteria 
related to fairness. One of the criteria for effective-
ness — appropriate scale — is addressed through a 
multilevel structure that operates at the scale of the 
basin as well as at the scale of distinct subareas of the 
basin. Multilevel structures may also help meet the ef-
fectiveness criterion of capacity by enabling the GSP 
development process to draw upon the knowledge and 
resources of local agencies.
Multilevel structures, however, could also pose 
some challenges for effectiveness. GSP regulations re-
quire that plans identify minimum thresholds for each 
of the six undesirable results, measurable objectives 
that will result in sustainable management, and 5-year 
interim milestones (California Code of Regulations, 
Title 23, Subarticle 3). The regulations allow for mea-
surable objectives and thresholds to be defined differ-
ently in each management area, as long as achieving 
them together will result in sustainability. The Yolo 
Subbasin Groundwater Agency is taking steps to imple-
ment this approach by developing water budgets at all 
three decision-making scales (individual agency, multi-
agency and basinwide). However, since responsibility 
for implementation has been delegated to the indi-
vidual agency level, it may prove challenging to ensure 
that all necessary management actions are undertaken 
to reach a basinwide sustainability goal. In particular, it 
may be difficult to encourage local agencies to develop 
and act upon triggers that provide early warning before 
thresholds are crossed (Christian-Smith and Abhold 
2015). While the Yolo Subbasin Groundwater Agency 
retains the authority to intervene if sustainability crite-
ria are not being met, such a provision does not exist in 
the basinwide JPA in the Eastern San Joaquin basin.
 Ensuring adequate funding, another criterion for 
effectiveness identified by Kiparsky et al. (2016), may 
also be challenging. In our case study basins, respon-
sibility for setting fees is largely allocated to individual 
agencies. If these agencies prove unwilling or unable to 
establish new fees when necessary, this could jeopar-
dize timely GSP implementation.
Our case studies do not capture the full range of 
California’s diverse agricultural settings. Each basin’s 
governance arrangements will be influenced by its in-
stitutional context, past experiences with collaboration, 
and even by particular individuals who play significant 
roles in the process. Differences in agricultural settings 
may also influence outcomes. For example, in basins 
with large numbers of small farms, more effort may be 
needed to find feasible avenues to represent the inter-
ests of private pumpers. The extent and distribution of 
tree crops, which can increase dependence on ground-
water, may affect farmers’ interests in participating in 
a GSA and might shape how management areas are 
formed. Research analyzing a larger number of basins 
is needed to understand how such factors influence 
governance arrangements.
While further research is needed to understand 
factors that influence collaborative governance struc-
tures and the effectiveness of multilevel arrangements 
for SGMA implementation, the experiences of our 
three case studies may be helpful as GSAs consider 
how they will work together at a basin scale to prepare 
one or more GSPs, or if they decide to change their 
Key Case Study Findings
Concerns of agricultural stakeholders:
• Most agricultural stakeholders wanted to preserve some autonomy over de-
cision-making, particularly with regard to setting fees and extraction limits.
• Irrigation, reclamation and other water districts sought to protect their ability 
to control surface water supplies and to receive credit for groundwater re-
charge. Under SGMA, these districts had the option to form their own GSAs.
• Private pumpers outside of district boundaries (often called white areas) 
were concerned about the potential fees and pumping restrictions that a 
new GSA might impose. Concerned that the county, the default GSA for 
these areas, would not represent their interests adequately, they sought and 
gained a voice in decision-making due to the widely recognized legitimacy 
of their interests.
How these concerns influenced governance:
• Stakeholders ultimately agreed upon collaborative governance arrange-
ments at the basin scale.
• Concerns about autonomy were accommodated by creating multilevel 
governance structures in which decision-making is distributed across three 
levels: basinwide, multi-agency and individual agency.
• Counties represent private pumpers in the GSAs of all three basins, but pri-
vate pumper representatives and the Farm Bureau have voices in decision-
making at basinwide and multi-agency levels.
52 CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE • VOLUME 72, NUMBER 1
governance structures. In particular, our case studies 
suggest that if the multiple GSAs in basins across the 
Central Valley have not already done so, they should 
begin to consider questions of basin-scale governance, 
including how they will work together to meet SGMA’s 
basinwide coordination requirements, how responsi-
bilities will be shared across individual agency, multi-
agency and basinwide levels,  and how private pumper 
interests will be considered in each.
Our case studies, as well as experiences in other 
basins, show that building collaboration requires 
extensive dialogue, and significant time and com-
mitment on the part of all participants. For example, 
the Yolo Subbasin Groundwater Agency’s GSA notice 
documents over 175 meetings between May 2014 and 
June 2017 at which the GSA formation process was 
discussed. In addition, a preliminary study of eight 
GSA formation processes under way in late 2016 sug-
gested that two factors — positive prior experience 
with collaboration and the presence of trusted lead-
ership at the basin scale — were particularly impor-
tant in supporting collaboration (Conrad et al. 2016). 
As stakeholders gain more experience working with 
one another in the coming years, it is possible that 
some GSAs may decide to consolidate into a single 
basinwide GSA. 
Much more remains to be understood regarding the 
effectiveness of different governing arrangements in 
managing groundwater basins sustainably. Studies that 
compare different GSA governance models, including 
collaborative and noncollaborative as well as multi- or 
single-level governance arrangements, would help 
to inform SGMA implementation, as well as provide 
much-needed insight into whether and how collabora-
tion works to manage resources at large scales. c
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